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Statue of Dai Viet soldiers confronting the “sea of ​​people” tactics of the Song Dynasty

Opening the war, the Song army captured Ngoc Son camp in Vinh An province (present-day Mong Cai) to support the Song navy in Kham Chau. As soon as Quach Quy’s army was still in Dam Chau, General Nham Khoi led the Song vanguard to attack Ngoc Son camp from the end of July 1076 and captured this camp in mid-August 1076. With a border post like Ngoc Son camp, which lasted for about half a month, it proved that the resistance of Dai Viet soldiers in this place was not small.

Statue of Dai Viet soldiers confronting the

That’s why when he went down to reward Nham Khoi to encourage the soldiers’ morale, the Song king had to get high.”Although the public is not big, it is also the first time to excite a good soldier.”After this battle, the Song army used the area of ​​Ngoc Son camp to control Vinh An province, as a springboard to prepare for the navy. The main land front lay in other directions. In October 1076, Quach Quy’s army advanced and stationed in Tu Minh, Bang Tuong bordering our country, dividing troops to attack the gates to open the way to enter Dai Viet inland.

If the Song state wanted to occupy Dai Viet, they had to first deal with the system of border outposts and ethnic minority forces in the border areas of the two countries. Previously, when the Dai Viet army attacked the Song nation, a large coalition was assembled, with most of the Dai Viet chiefs participating in the war. After defeating Ung Chau, there were also chieftains of the Song territory who followed with Dai Viet. Now the Song brought down the army, using a lot of wealth to lure, the Song chiefs quickly returned to the Song dynasty in turn. Tong also allowed guest speakers to come in contact with the chieftains of Dai Viet territory, using many words of both seduction and intimidation to sway the spirit of ethnic minority leaders. On the Dai Viet side, the chiefs’ reactions varied greatly. There were cases of fighting very enthusiastically against the invaders, only surrendering when forced to do nothing else. There was a case where he fought with his heart to his last breath for Dai Viet. But there were also some chiefs who quickly surrendered, even betraying the Song army.

Among the chiefs, first of all, chieftain Luu Ky in Quang Nguyen province (Cao Bang). Trieu Tiet once said to Quach Quy: “Luu Ky was in Quang Nguyen, Than Canh Phuc was in the Giap cave, and they were all strong soldiers.” Quang Nguyen area was one of the first gateways for the Song army to enter our country by road. Therefore, Luu Ky and his army were the ones who soon had to face the mass infantry of the Song army. Initially, the Song king also thought that it was easy to lure Luu Ky. Because in the past in 1073, Luu Ky had heard the instigation of the Guangxi Kinh strategist Shen Khoi to ask his grandfather to belong to the Song, but at that time, Song did not dare to accept it because he was afraid that he would soon reveal his plan to annex Dai Viet. But in fact, after a period of attachment with Dai Viet’s army and people, together with Luu Ky, he completely changed his stance and became a loyal leader to Dai Viet.

In December 1076, the Song army from Siming Province on the Song border attacked Quang Nguyen Province. General Yen Dat and Tu Ky led troops one after another to enter Quang Nguyen area. Luu Ky and his 5,000 troops relied on tenacious fighting terrain, surrounded the front army of Song, killed and captured thousands of enemies. But Yen Dat relied on the majority, urged the central army to risk their lives to rescue, and Luu Ky had to relax the siege and retreat to the base. The Song army could not penetrate the Luu Ky base. Yen Dat set up a plan to separate and send spies to infiltrate the people to spread the news that Luu Ky had promised to surrender to the Song army. The small leaders in the caves won the plan, pulled together to bring the Song army first for peace of mind. Luu Ky was besieged, and reluctantly had to surrender on January 1, 1077. The Song army captured the chief Luu Ky, his family and other generals and brought them back to the Song, 5,000 Quang Nguyen troops were also taken prisoner. The Song army entered the Quang Nguyen base to rescue 3,000 previously captured soldiers. The caves of Quang Nguyen and neighboring provinces were lost to the Song army and were forced to supply food.

Song army from Quang Nguyen province advanced to attack Mon Chau, chieftains Hoang Kim Man and Sam Khanh Tan in this area had colluded with Tong before, quickly surrendered and acted as a guide for Song. The Song army from Tu Lang province advanced to attack To Mau, the chief Vi Thu An also listened to Tong’s advice to surrender and laid down his weapons.

On January 8, 1077, Quach Quy’s main army crossed the Nam Quan pass to attack Quang Lang district. The Song army encountered the army of the concubine Than Canh Phuc and the imperial army at Quyet Ly pass. Here, a fierce battle took place. The Dai Viet army, with the help of a statue of a soldier, was able to stop the Song army in a short time and cause a lot of damage, but the Song army used arrows to shoot at the elephant and sent a large number of soldiers to cut the trunk of the elephant, so the statue turned and ran. Dai Viet troops commanded by the concubine Than Canh Phuc had to retreat to Giap Khau pass (ie Chi Lang pass) and set up ambushes to wait for the enemy. This pass is especially dangerous, previously the Northern generals suffered great casualties here.

Quach Quy was an experienced general, detected an ambush, so he did not dare to enter the pass but accepted a difficult detour, following the guidance of elements from the surrendering Dai Viet side. The Song army crossed the Bac Son mountain range to Yen The, which was a powerful shortcut to attack the rear of the Dai Viet army’s line. At Van Linh village, enemy cavalry encountered the imperial reserve army used to support Giap Khau pass. The appearance of the Song army was a great surprise to the Dai Viet army here because the path chosen by the Song army was very narrow and dangerous, and it took a familiar person to be able to go right. But no matter what, the Dai Viet army was determined to fight to the death, relying on the high mountain position to shoot crossbows and throw stones at the Song army, causing great casualties, and driving elephants to kill the Song army a lot.

The pioneering general of the Song, Tu Ky, had to work very hard to get through thanks to the priority of the number of troops, one class after another overflowed, causing the Dai Viet army to fall. Quach Quy’s detour was outside the battle plan of Dai Viet army, the entire army ambushed at Giap Khau pass was in danger of being attacked in the rear and annihilated. Concerned about that, Than Canh Phuc took advantage of the night to retreat and guard the mountains and forests of Dong Giap, waiting for an opportunity to ambush behind the enemy. While Quach Quy’s central army had to face battle with Than Canh Phuc and a few small armies, Trieu Tiet’s army in the direction of Bang Tuong (under the Song) entered Dai Viet, following Binh Gia, Van Nhai, and Nha Nam. went ahead and encountered almost no obstacle. The Song armies followed three intersections along the Cau River, Thuong River, and Luc Nam River and advanced like a storm, no more troops in the area could stop the enemy’s advance.

In less than 10 days, the Song armies had come to the Phu Luong River to join forces, that is, close to Thang Long – the heart of Dai Viet. To get to this place, the Song army had left a total of nearly 10,000 soldiers on the border lines. Quach Quy was still in more than 9,000 cavalry troops. On the other side of the river is the open road leading to Dai Viet citadel, into the fertile central plains. From Nhu Nguyet wharf to Thang Long is only about 20km away. If the Song army crossed the river, Dai Viet would almost certainly perish.

But here, the Song army encountered a line of unprecedented scale that Ly Thuong Kiet and Dai Viet’s army and people worked so hard to build many months ago. That was the Nhu Nguyet line that blocked the Thien Ly road (the big road through north and south). On the shore, layers of bamboo stilts and barricades with tens of thousands of infantry are available. Down the river, rows of Dai Viet warships patrolled. At this time, the Song army had no way to go around and dodge because at that time this was almost the only intersection that an army could go through.

The Song army camped on the north bank of the Phu Luong River, right at the northern bank of Nhu Nguyet wharf. Quach Quy set up a system of long salary transfer stations from the Tong-Vietnam border to the place where the army was stationed. Quach Quy’s original plan was to station troops waiting to coordinate with the Song marines. However, we will see that naval warfare has never been something that the Vietnamese have shown to be incompetent. The Dai Viet naval wing led by General Ly Ke Nguyen in the northeast at that time was also fighting to block the enemy’s advance. Dai Viet’s fate depended not only on the fighting inland, but also on the outcome of the battle between the warships on the northeastern coast.

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